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## The Mark of Freudian Subversion

*The Logic of the Not-All*

The institution, as a product of the inter-human relation, sets up forms of social bonds which are structured by language. It harbors for each person the possibility of speaking. In the institution, it is only logical that one be sensitive to, even privilege, the Request insofar as, conditioned by language, it is the elaborated manifestation of the subject who speaks. What happens when one speaks? Lacan has taught us that one does three things. First, one takes place. This means that, according to the place where one speaks, the very effect of the speech can find itself changed; from whence the necessity in an institution to propose different places. Secondly, one takes language. Speech, like it or not, even when one refuses to speak, implies an address, an other, a place toward which it is emitted. Discourse, as a signifying articulation, founds the social bond installed by the act of speaking due to the fact that it puts two places into a relationship. Thirdly, one takes power. Every speech act puts into play two places in making the one relate to the other, an agent who acts on another. This is the matrice of all action on the other, which necessitates the introduction of a new place to situate the effect of this action, and it is this that produces the discourse: the place of production. It is there that the institution, because of the master discourse that it incarnates, founds its power. The institution supposes that the speech act sets out from the master signifier -- the ideal of curing -- by linking the child to be cured to a therapist. So this speech act will have already structured an action and an effect on the child. The institution harbors discourses, distributes signifiers which try to give a place to each person.

In this institutional shelter, Lacan challenged the psychoanalyst to take on a political function. If an institution feels up to the Freudian subversion, it must, at its very center, harbor a space that psychoanalysis renders absolutely necessary for any inscription in a discourse -- the place of the truth. The fact that one doesn't know what one is saying in the framework of a psychoanalysis supposes that two places are acting, unbeknownst to the subject: there is a truth to what one says which is different from what one says in and of itself.

Freud incessantly revealed to us that, to be the agent of what one says, one must bear a truth of which one is ignorant. One doesn't have the truth of what one says. The place of the agent of a discourse, being that of the patient of the truth, reveals itself as the place of the pretender. The pretender is necessary because speaking always means installing oneself in the place of the pretender.

Yann, an hysteric subject, knows this; when he speaks, he installs himself in this place of pretending to be the agent, showing admirably though not without a few hurdles that being unable to say the truth that moves him, he speaks in its place, assuring himself of it with the incessant «Me, I want...» that makes him unbearable. One never knows what he really wants, and in any case it will never be what he's asked for. The political function of psychoanalysis would be to remind us that it is exactly the truth that moves the signifying machine, which one expects to get rolling so that one can either locate in it the division that will make one human, or produce oneself in it as subject. What remains to be seen for each case is what is in the place of truth for that subject. Yann teaches us that because the subject speaks, every subject is hysteric, having installed in the place of the truth an object which causes him/her, which divides him/her and inscribes for him/her a singular sort of speech. In other words, that which is not identifiable in any of the subject's requests, but which supports each of his/her requests.

But Lacan reminds us that for every discourse, there is always an impossible, a discordance, a real between this place of the truth and the place of production. What produces a discourse never joins up to the truth. The effect of speaking never attains its cause. We have to examine what happens for psychotic children when it is the real of *jouissance* which subverts the cause moving this place of the truth. This *jouissance*, because it is unstowed, unattached, delocalized from the place of the truth, propels or fixes the so-called psychotic subject outside discourse, outside of the place of pretend agent. No pretending seems to hold it.

We put to work in our action a statement Lacan made that condenses the two sides of his thesis on the effect of language on the

reality of the subject: «Language, if it certainly does not all fulfill, structures all of the inter-human relation.» This statement orients us beyond the sole definition of the subject as an effect of the signifier, by introducing us to a dimension of the subject as having a direct relation to jouissance, to the real, to the impossible to say. From where the signifier is missing or doesn't work, to this place of not all is signified, even if all is structured, jouissance is there as either butted up against the goal and inert or as a response for the subject. But it is there well before the question which is above all a mode of social bond (think of the «why?» of Little Hans).

We might draw a lesson from Freud's Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality: the experiences of the subject, notably the jouissance of the body, don't find their signification, or even their effects, except through a structuring of the subject's reality through language, «through the procession of the signifier.» At the Request of or to the Other, the subject suspends the satisfaction of his needs (more precisely, beyond his request is the truth of his desire), as well as the solution to the enigma of jouissance which brings him, through his problems, to pose himself there as question. The theory that he will construct, whether false or not, is always structured from the point of view of the truth and the certainty that concerns the origins of the drive, which is to say, the real at play in his relation to the Other. The neurotic child's motor is the signifier and the speech brought about by the object-cause-of-desire in the place of the truth. This truth born by the subject, unbeknownst to him, would become the agent of a discourse inscribing him in the social bond.

The clinic of childhood psychosis keeps us ever alert to the fact that language, for him, doesn't «bite,» doesn't take hold on the body and doesn't isolate this object for him. For the psychotic child, language fails to fix or localize the jouissance in a logic of borders, of inside/outside. It fails to cut his body into so-called erogenous zones where the drive, from the fact that there has been speech, finds its echo, its place at the Request to or from the Other. In by-passing the procession of the signifier, jouissance finds itself unstowed, unattached, destabilized. But it borrows other logical processions which, in pantomime or stereotypic behavior, plainly unveils the discord in language between being and jouissance. The clinic of childhood psychosis reminds us that there is a real which insists, and that it would be better defined as an impossible to bear.

Where there was the Pantomime, the Subject Must Come to Be

The psychoanalyst must assure himself of his political function at the heart of the institution by starting with the logical consequences of this not-all. Not all is language for the subject, which necessitates that the psychoanalyst clear an empty space in the place from which he speaks,

clear a vector which, beyond the place of the truth, assures an orientation of *jouissance* for each case, but also for the institution. There, *jouissance* becomes the sister of the truth. Thus, the institution must harbor at its heart, for each case, this tension inherent to the structure. Lacan qualified this tension as discord and later, setting out from the dimension of the real, gave it a logical and topological place, that of the not-all which is the gap between *jouissance* and the signifier.

The subject we receive, to whom we address ourselves, even if he or she is said to «not talk,» is prey to the symbolic system of language which makes of him/her an understanding being. And the unstowed *jouissance* manifest in his/her agitation, behavior, screams out to remind us that he/she is a fleshly being already at work to signify this originary *jouissance*. The borders of the Other, our borders, are put into question, or put at a distance by the circuits, the limits that the subject imposes on him/herself. «He partitions,» one father told us, indicating to us a subject already at work. Thus, we have to be sensitive to another motor than that of the object which, in the place of the truth, causes desire.

In place of this truth while not attached to the place of truth, we have to deal with a *jouissance* to which very little pretend attaches. Occupied with the regulation of the *jouissance* of the Other which submerges them, these subjects don't manage to hook the underpinning cord of desire onto the nail of the request, as Antonio De Ciaccia said.<sup>1</sup> We have heard it said that with Jean-Francois at first it was hell, with Alain it was horrible, and as to Jeremy you couldn't say a single thing to him without him breaking all the lights, actualizing for us Kant's question, that of the age of illumination, «Would you have the courage to make use of your own understanding?» However, bit by bit, we've seen this hell, this horror organize itself, reduce itself, even pacify itself. And there, where we expected a request, a statement to decipher, we had the unbearable behavior, the pantomime just as much to be deciphered.

Jacques-Alain Miller, speaking of Rosine Lefort's case study of Little Robert, remarked that his behavior was accompanied by words. «A stump of speech,» Lacan would say, specifying, «at least two words.» In fact, one sees that he had quite a vocabulary, which rendered him also rather verbal, which is to say, subject to verbs. Jacques-Alain Miller has taught us to suppose his behavior to be a pantomime, and we already foresee it as an attempt to treat *jouissance*, an attempt to make a border. We might risk the hypothesis of a subject supposed to pantomime: there where there was pantomime, the subject must come? From then on we can pose Jacques-Alain Miller's question, what are the relations between pantomime and language? Is it about a text or is it a text in and of itself?

If it wishes to bear the mark of Freudian subversion, an institution must harbor at its heart the subversive truth of the pantomime. It cannot conceive of itself with the value it has for the speaking-being, except in reference to the coordinates furnished by the structure of language. We hypothesized that these behaviors were structured by the mechanism we offered. To the person who said the problem was that the autistic didn't hear, Lacan marked his disagreement and made of the autistic also a being of hearing and understanding, but more radically as a being who hears himself. Lacan specified that the autistic articulates many things, that he is even rather verbal, but that it is a question, in each case, to discover from where he hears what he articulates, even from where he organizes his pantomime and the intense and repetitive circuits where he hears himself as a One alone with himself. Lacan even accords the autistic a subjective position, telling us that what the autistic doesn't hear is exactly what one says to him when one wants to take care of him. He even says, at another moment, that in blocking his ears, the autistic protects himself from the verb that is within him. Doesn't the autistic incarnate the place of he who refuses to enter into speech, for he would lose a part of his *jouissance* which paradoxically gives him his truth? Refusing to lose his being, he loses his place and his body. This refusal of the intimations of the Other, refusal to be called by the Other, this distancing of the Other, makes him, even if he doesn't speak, the master of language.

Paradoxically, we have chosen to give to that master what he refuses, speech, that with him we treat as an object. To do this from his position of power, we give him a place so that he might take up his tongue. After that, how do we locate the place of the subject? By first investigating language more deeply. Lacan qualified it as an organ which doesn't just fulfill a function of inter-human relation, of communication. It also makes the subject and permits the subject to position himself in it, to identify himself by representing himself with it, then to communicate what language has made of his being. Lacan, inspired by the structuralists, radically departs from them by the supplementary step he adds, that of the Freudian subversion. The structuralists vaunt a mythically complete structure that Lacan decompiles by one element, by one less signifier leaving a hole, an empty space, a not-all, which permits him to include a heterogenous element -- the subject. Paradoxically, while the subject isn't an element of the structure, he finds himself part of it. Language, the grand Other, which is to say, the structure that makes the subject, also allows him to include his being in it as a heterogenous element. The subject finds his habitat. The neurotic will find in this language a habit, an image to clothe himself in, allowing him to pretend to be the object (a) of the Other. Jacques Lacan has taught us that the psychotic realizes this object (a) of the Other, which doesn't hinder him that much from being in the language and addressing to us what language has done to him, whether by his request or by his pantomime.

This means that in all linguistic production one will be led to consider two things: on the one hand, the content of the message carried by the code of the Other (the signifier of the request), and on the other hand, the fact of the saying as the point of enunciation. Thanks to Lacan, we distinguish the statement from the enunciation. This means that all speech implies a subject (that from which one takes act) and an address that we call, with Lacan, the Other, the absolute Other present in all speech beyond the particular other who might be concerned in the experience. Lacan taught us to grasp the position of the subject in language by the example of the French negative particle called the pleonastic *ne*. The *ne* in «Je crains qu'il **ne** vienne illustrates this floating place between the statement and the enunciation, seizing the moment in which the I speaks truthfully and not the moment in which I am spoken. The pleonastic *ne* illustrates the discord between the statement and the enunciation of the subject who states from his place of enunciation his proper fear, in other words his subjective position.<sup>2</sup>

Take for example the cry of the autistic child, David, which happens when one retracts from him the speech he hasn't made, when one has just given it to him in esteeming that it was his turn to pronounce his thoughts on what was under debate during the meeting. This cry perhaps indicates the simple avowal of his presence. Even though reduced to a pure cry, it indicates that there is an intention to signify something, a subject with intention to address the Other. Moreover, why not take his refusal to speak accompanied by a pantomime as already having the value of a response for us? In any case, he will respond to us in coming out of his mutism when, in our turn, authenticating his mutism as a mode of response, we refuse to give him what he refuses to give us -- speech. We interpret David's cry as a speech that one attributes to him, if one puts him in the position of subject. For us, it is a knotting point, illustrating the subjective position he occupies, floating in the bath of language. Doesn't this cry assure us of the constitution of a subject?

For all that, can we vary the modalities of the request in the cry to make it a call, from the imperative exigence of the superego to the complaint? Lacan remarked that the matrice of the introduction of the subject into language, that this interpretation of the cry as speech, was entirely submitted to the discretionary power of the auditor. For Lacan, the primacy is accorded to the Other in the subject's setting to function of language. This power is left to the discretion of the auditor, to his power to discern it. He has the free decision of what sense to give this cry, even more what sense to give this being. Nadia has taught us about this power to discern when she explains how she got out of her autism, how she abandoned her pantomime, the tapping with a leaf from a tree that she passed whole days at doing. She named it with a neologism: the nuancity

of the Other's response that we had incarnated for her. In distinguishing the statement from the enunciation, we had admitted that any statement or pantomime contained reference to the Other for her. From then on, we considered it a request to which we offered various responses.

The role taken in the institution is to admit that a speech, even a simple word accompanying a pantomime, is always a request because it is addressed to the Other. Lacan, in his Seminar on The Psychoses, reminds us of the proper use of the signifier, insofar as, at the level of the receiver, at the point where the message has arrived, one acts and one acknowledges reception. One considers oneself as the place addressed and as expected to acknowledge reception. There is a forced extension of the meaning of the request in all the statements of the subject, which is a clinical incident in daily practice with children. There it isn't a question of claiming a request, but to try to grasp that the request is going to orient itself in the direction of an analytic work. Look at Vincent, the young paranoiac for whom our putting into series the statements of the subject made an intransitive request appear, a request without object, if it wasn't a request aiming at the being, a request for love. One sequence illustrates this: during dinner, he offered the cheese to a guest who politely declined it. «Then you don't love me,» he declared and demanded that the guest slap him to show him love. In this case, where the refusal failed to be inscribed in the symbolic, one has a request for love to inscribe in the real of the body.

In «The Direction of the Cure,» Lacan notes that the request has a particular circuit.

...it is first of all for the subject that his speech is a message. By virtue of this fact even his demand originates in the locus of the Other, and is signed and dated as such. This is not only because it is subjected to the code of the Other, but also because it is marked by this locus (and even the time) of the Other.<sup>3</sup>

What we are trying to test is that most often for the psychotic child the request doesn't arise spontaneously, but it follows a circuit which starts in the Other. But which Other? Wasn't Vincent the child whose mother, overwhelmed, threw him out the window when he was very little? In any case, one sees that it is often from a request formulated by the Other that the child can, or cannot, install himself in the circuit by making a request in his own turn. It is often a signifier introduced by the Other which is taken up again by the child.

But note where the request in the Other originates: in a gap. For this reason, we have created at the heart of the institution an empty space, a place, a site where all the requests, as well as the pantomimes and

other symptoms, can take place and come to term. This place is a meeting which presentifies the place of the barred Other, the Other with holes in it which is not the detainer of responses, but who acknowledges reception. This place can be situated on Lacan's graph of desire in the position of S(/O). This is where we signify that something is missing in the structure of the institution, that it is not-all, it doesn't have the object that would coalesce with the request of the subject. The institution includes within itself the mark of Freudian castration. It resonates with the nothing that is the foundation of any request. It is the point from which any statement of the truth of the institution that might allow it to be complete is sunk. This enigmatic point marks the gap, the cleft between the Law and desire, which allows us to keep our desire radically enigmatic. More paradoxically, it is the way to avoid sustaining a clinic uniquely based on the request. Lacan qualified this place as the signifier of a lack in the Other, the point which decompletes the structure and incarnates the discord between the statement and the enunciation. This place, this meeting, is guaranteed by the at-least-one to have introduced the analytic discourse. It is he who, from his place of enunciation, bears the guarantee that the Other cannot be closed, is not detainer of knowledge. He guarantees a desire emptied of any therapeutic ideal.

<sup>1</sup> We invited Di Ciaccia and his team to speak about Antenna 110 in October, 1986.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Jacques Lacan. *The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VII: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis (1959-60)*. Ed. J.-A. Miller, trans. D. Porter, Norton, 1992; p. 64. [trans. note].

<sup>3</sup> Jacques Lacan. «The direction of the treatment and the principles of its power.» *Écrits: A Selection*. NY: Norton, 1977; p. 269.